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THE SOVIET-U.S.
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGREEMENT
On May 23, 1972, the United States and the Soviet Union entered
into a bilateral agreement concerning environmental protection,'
which was signed on April 11, 1972. This Environmental Protection
Agreement is one of the latest indications of an increasing awareness
of the need for an international approach to environmental prob-
lems, but the field of environmental protection is still largely
dominated by
•.. the two great laissez-faire principles of national sovereignty and
freedom of the high seas.2
Basically, these principles allow nations
S.. to conduct such activities injurious to the environment as they
please, up to the limits permitted ... by their own unilateral assess-
ment of their political, economic, military, and other requirements.3
This general rule is not, of course, absolute. For instance, the Trail
Smelter Case4 established the principle that
. . . no State has the right to use or permit the use of its territory in
such a manner as to cause [significant] injury by fumes in or to the
territory of another or the properties or persons therein... .
International agreements on various subjects have also been entered
into, modifying the general rule.6 The most comprehensive agree-
ment to date, in terms of the number of nations involved, is the
United Nations Declaration on the Human Environment [hereinafter,
the Stockholm Declaration].' While the Environmental Protection
1. Agreement on Cooperation in the Field of Environmental Protection with the Union
of Soviet Socialist Republics, May 23, 1972, [19721 23 U.S.T. 845, T.I.A.S. No. 7345
[hereinafter cited as EPA] ; N.Y. Times, May 24, 1972, at 14, col. 1.
2. Law, Institutions, and the Global Environment 93, (J. Hargrove ed. 1972).
3. Id.; see also Falk, Environmental Policy as a World Order Problem, 12 Natural Re-
sources J. 161, 163 (1972).
4. Trail Smelter Case (United States v. Canada) 3 U.N.R.I.A.A. 1905 (1935 [Special
Agreement], 1938 [Preliminary Decision], & 1941 [Final Decision]).
5. Id. at 1965.
6. See, e.g., Treaty with Great Britain [for Canada] Relating to Boundary Waters and
Questions Arising along the Boundary between the United States and Canada, January 11,
1909, 36 Stat. 2448, T.S. No. 548; International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution
of the Sea by Oil, opened for signature May 12, 1954, [1961] 12 U.S.T. 2989, T.I.A.S. No.
4900, 327 U.N.T.S. 3; Agreement with Canada on Great Lakes Water Quality, April 15,
1972, [1972] 23 U.S.T. 301, T.I.A.S. No. 7312.
7. 67 U.S. Dep't of State Bull. No. 116 (1972); N.Y. Times, Jun. 17, 1972, at 1, col. 8;
id. at 29, coL 1. For an excellent analysis see Sohn, The Stockholm Declaration on the
Human Environment, 14 Harv. Int'l L.J. 423 (1973).
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Agreement is a bilateral, rather than a multilateral, agreement, it may
have a greater potential effect on the human environment than even
the Stockholm Declaration.'
The Environmental Protection Agreement is basically an agree-
ment for joint study and will not necessarily lead to environmental
improvement without further agreements. The agreement contains
no definite commitment to apply the results of the-study. It does,
however, contain some indications of an intent to do more than
merely study the problem. Specifically, the agreement provides, inter
alia, that it ". . . will be devoted to working out measures to prevent
pollution ... and to develop the basis for controlling the impact of
human activities on nature." 9
Eleven specific areas of implementation, covering various aspects
of pollution and the environment, including protective measures, are
covered by the agreement.' 0 Four specific means of cooperation,
plus a comprehensive provision for "other forms of cooperation" are
also provided.' 1 Other important language in the agreement provides
for annual meetings of a joint committee to be held alternately in
Washington and Moscow.' 2 Also included is a five year effective
period, to be automatically extended for successive periods in the
absence of specific termination by a party.' 3
Although an extended treatment of the legal effect of the Environ-
mental Protection Agreement is beyond the scope of this Comment,
a short treatment of its legal effect, from the viewpoint of United
States law, is in order. Since there was no participation by the Senate
in the approval of the agreement, it is not a "treaty" as that term is
commonly understood in the United States, but rather it is an
"executive agreement" which may have substantially the same status
as a treaty.1 4 As pointed out by McDougal and Lans,
[a] greements with other governments made pursuant to the Presi-
dent's authority alone when within the scope of his independent
powers, have ... substantially the same status as treaties under both
international law and the municipal law of the United States .... 1 5
Regardless of whether the Environmental Protection Agreement
8. See N.Y. Times, May 24, 1972, at 46, col. 1; id., Sep. 23, 1972, at 30, col. 1.
9. EPA, at art. 2.
10. Id.
11. Id., at art. 3.
12. Id., at art. 5.
13. Id., at art. 7.
14. See Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations Law, § § 119-121 (1965).
15. McDougal & Lans, Treaties and Congressional Executive or Presidential Agreements:
Interchangeable Instruments of National Policy, in McDougal & Associates, Studies in World
Public Order 404, 426-27 (1960).
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could be said to fall within the scope of the President's independent
powers, it is still an important gentlemen's agreement and the parties
will likely voluntarily adhere to it. It could also lead, eventually, to a
treaty or to "internationally prescribed municipal legislation."'1 6
With the growing realization that "[p]ollution is not only ob-
livious to national boundaries, [but] ... also no respecter or ideo-
logical niceties,"' ' there is an increasing agreement that some sort of
international approach to environmental problems is needed.1 I In
the words of Mr. Justice Douglas:
While we people of the earth divide it up into separate jurisdictional
entities, the biosphere is unitary. If we are to protect and save the
biosphere from dangerous pollution, the controls in large measure
must be international.' 9
Aside from the fact that environmental problems are rarely, if ever,
peculiar to one nation, there is another potential advantage to an
international approach. Such an approach will allow the problems to
be studied and acted upon from more than one economic, social or
political viewpoint.2 0
While there is a general consensus that an international approach
of some sort is needed, there is little or no agreement as to exactly
what type of approach is most feasible. At first consideration, a
broad, multilateral agreement, such as the Stockholm Declaration,
might appear to be a better approach, since environmental problems
affect the entire world. But, because the Stockholm Declaration does
involve so many nations, with widely differing political, economic
and social systems, problems may result.2 1 For example, there may
16. Brown, The Conventional Law of the Environment, 13 Natural Resources J. 203
(1973).
17. Goldman, Pollution: International Complications, 2 Environmental Affairs 1, 4-5
(1972-73).
18. Burhenne & Schoenbaum, European Community and Management of the Environ-
ment: A Dilemma, 13 Natural Resources J. 494 (1973):
The need for cooperation on the international level has been felt because (1)
disparate national environmental measures can disrupt patterns of inter-
national trade and competition; (2) common resources such as the oceans and
the atmosphere demand common protective action; (3) activities taking place
in one state can have an adverse effect on persons and property in another
state; and (4) the similarity of the problems in most countries generates a
cooperative search for similar solutions.
19. Douglas, Pollution: An International Problem Needing International Solution, 7 Tex.
Int'l L.J. 1 (1971-72).
20. See EPA, at Preamble.
21. See Goldman, supra note 17; Utton, Environmental Policy and International Institu-
tional Arrangements: A Proposal for Regional and Global Environmental Protection
Agencies, 11 Natural Resources J. 513, 515-16 (1971). N.Y. Times, Jun. 17, 1972, at 29,
col. 1.
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be resistance from the "developing nations" to moving beyond the
broad statements of the Stockholm Declaration to practical imple-
mentation. The reason for that resistance is well stated in a recent
note:
International acceptance of broad policy statements furnishes no
real solution to the world-wide pollution problem. Any modification
of environmental policy that causes economic repercussions will gen-
erate intense reaction, particularly among developing nations. It may
be that standards of pollution control, in any form, will be possible
only in narrowly defined economic areas among a limited number of
nations with similar interests. 2 2 [Footnotes in original omitted.]
Even if there were no other drawbacks, the Stockholm Declaration
might suffer from the fact that, with more nations involved, any
meaningful action would require at least the tacit approval of many
governments, which might delay action on important problems.
The Environmental Protection Agreement, being a bilateral agree-
ment, has both advantages and disadvantages as compared to a multi-
lateral agreement such as the Stockholm Declaration. One advantage
is simply the reverse of the situation with a multilateral agreement-
two governments should be able to reach agreement with less delay
than several governments. Another is that both parties are at roughly
similar stages of technology and development,2 3 and they should be
able to share both the work and the results on a fairly equal basis. 2 4
Perhaps the most important advantage is that, despite some loss of
prestige, each party is still largely a leader on one side or the other of
world alignment. Each party may, therefore, be able to influence its
allies to adopt many of the technologies and techniques developed as
a result of the initially bilateral cooperation.2 1
22. Note, International Trade Implications of Pollution Control, 58 Cornell L. Rev. 368,
373-74 (1972-73).
23. Brown, supra note 16, at 204:
... [The Environmental Protection Agreement's] significance as a reflection
of the improved relations between the two States should not detreact from its
value as a framework for useful cooperative work between two of the world's
most technologically advanced states. [Emphasis added]
McWhinney, Changing Science and Technology and International Law, 6 Ind. L. Rev. 172,
176 (1972),
[T] he national interest-benefitting two super-powers at roughly the same
level of industrialization and of general scientific and technological develop-
ment-has usually been perceived in essentially identical terms. [Emphasis
added]
24. See EPA, at art. 1.
25. See McWhinney, suppra note 23, at 175-76:
The preferred operational methodology for international law-making in the
era of Bipolarity, leading to the Bipolar... detente, has been direct bilateral
negotiations between the two block leaders, preferably at Summit Meetings a
deux far from the rhetorical exaggerations and the playing to the gallery so
[Vol. 14
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Besides its advantages, the Environmental Protection Agreement
has at least two potential disadvantages. First, despite the possibility
that the parties will be able to use their positions as world leaders to
influence some countries, the "Third World" will be more difficult to
influence, because of their distrust of both the Soviet Union and the
United States.2 6 Second, there is the possibility that the Soviet
Union and the United States, being rivals in international politics,
will allow their rivalry to stand in the way of genuine cooperation.2 7
The Environmental Protection Agreement certainly should not be
looked upon as the answer to the environmental crisis. While it is
reasonably comprehensive in the areas of implementation,2 8 there
are some areas which are not covered. For example, the agreement
says nothing about population control, which many authorities con-
sider to be the most important single factor in the environmental
crisis.2 One author has pointed out that:
... [i]f one were to single out that area of greatest promise in
reducing environmental ills, it would undoubtedly focus on excessive
rate of growth of population-whether in so-called development or
developing countries.30
often attendant upon the usual public arenas in the United Nations. These
direct bilateral negotiations have invariably resulted in bilateral accords or
formal agreements which have later been opened to adherence by the other,
lessor or supporting, countries but usually without any possibility of modifica-
tion or amendment ...
EPA, art. 2 provides that:
The Parties .... upon mutual agreement .... will share the results of such
cooperation with other countries.
26. Falk, supra note 3, at 164-65:
Leaders from poor countries see the environmental agenda as a subtle way to
deprive them of the wealth and power that have accrued to the advanced
industrial societies.... From a Third World perspective, then, the problems
associated with environmental degradation, to the extent they exist, should be
dealt with in such a way as to avoid any interference with economic develop-
ment.
27. Falk, supra note 3, at 165:
[El yen though the interests among developed countries [e.g. the U.S. and the
U.S.S.R.] are convergent in relation to environmental quality, the prospect of
an implementing (as distinct from a pious) consensus on action remain poor.
Just as with disarmament... the dynamics of competition lead to an endless
search for relative advantage, to distrust of rival proposals, and to a
self-interested set of perceptions that induce contradictory assessments of
what constitutes a reasonable adjustment. [Emphasis in the original]
28. EPA, at art. 2. See N.Y. Times, Sep. 19, 1972, at 8, col. 1.
29. See, e.g., P. Ehrlich, The Population Bomb (rev. ed. 1971); P. & A. Ehrlich, Popula-
tion, Resources, Environment: Issues in Human Ecology (2d ed. 1972); Population, Evolu-
tion, and Birth Control: A Collage of Controversial Ideas (2d ed. G. Hardin 1969); U.S.
Dep't of Int., The Population Challenge: What it Means to America (Conservation Yearbook
#2, 1966).
30. Wolman, Global Pollution and Human Rights, 12 Natural Resources J. 195, 196
(1972).
April 1974]
NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL
Nevertheless, while it may not be the best possible approach to en-
vironmental problems, the Environmental Protection Agreement is
one way to deal with them.
We should ... not be sidetracked by shallow debate over the ex-
clusive value of one pollutional-control approach over another when
it is clear that we must proceed on all levels simultaneously. 3 1
[Emphasis in the original]
Although the Environmental Protection Agreement does have its
shortcomings, the advantages seem to outweight the disadvantages.
The agreement was implemented in detail within five months of its
effective date, when the joint committee 3 2 held its first meeting in
Moscow, September 18-21, 1972.1 3 Thirty projects
to benefit and protect the cities, farms, rivers, lakes and air of both
countries 3 4 were agreed upon.
These projects, involving
air and water pollution, oil spills, seismic research .... urban en-
vironmental problems, pest management ... , atmospheric pollu-
tion . . . [from] supersonic transportation, and . . problems in
permafrost regions ....
comprehensively cover each of the eleven areas of implementation of
the agreement. 6
If further progress under the agreement is achieved, then the
parties will be able to use their influence as world leaders to persuade
other nations to use the results of the joint programs for their own
environmental improvement. Other possibilities also exist. For
example, the agreement, with its emphasis on "improving existing
technologies and developing new technologies which do not pollute
the environment, ' 37 could eventually lead to a treaty that would
require testing of products and technologies before they are
marketed. Possibly, the parties could form the nucleus of an "Inter-
31. Grieves, International Law and the Environmental Issue, 1 Environmental Affairs
826, 833 (1971-72).
32. EPA, at art. 5.
33. Memorandum of Implementation of the Agreement with the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics on Cooperation in the Field of Environmental Protection of May 23,
1972, 67 U.S. Dep't State Bull. 451 (1972) (memo signed Sep. 21, 1972) [hereinafter cited
as Memo of Implementation].
34. N.Y. Times, Sep. 22, 1972, at 1, col. 8. Id. at 13, cols. 1, 5.
35. Id. at 1, col 8.
36. EPA, at art. 2. See Memo of Implementation, supra note 33.
37. EPA, at art. 2.
38. Dorsey, A Proposed International Agreement to Anticipate and Avoid Environmental
Damage, 6 Ind. L. Rev. (1972).
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national Environmental Agency," 3 9 to consist of both communist
and non-communist members from "leading industrial and maritime
nations.",4 0 A more likely possibility is the potential of the Environ-
mental Protection Agreement for providing an example for develop-
ing better patterns of international cooperation. 4'
Some of these possibilities are mere speculation and may never
happen, but even if the Environmental Protection Agreement leads
only to better communication about environmental matters, the
Soviet Union and the United States will have achieved a significant
goal.
WELDON L. MERRITT
39. Kennan, To Prevent a World Wasteland: A Proposal, 48 Foreign Affairs 401, 411
(1969-70).
40. Id., at 410. The author suggests the non-feasibility of involving the entire world
community in such an organization:
Obviously no single government could stand as the patron for such an
agency. To seek, on the other hand, the sanction of the entire international
community for its inception and activity would scarcely be a promising under-
taking. Aside from the fact that this would then necessitate procedures prac-
tically indistinguishable from those of the United Nations itself, it would mean
involving in the control and operation of the entity to be established a host of
smaller and less developed countries which could contribute very little to the
solution of the problems at hand. It would also involve formidable delays and
heavy problems of decision-making. Were this to be the course selected, one
would do better to content one's self, throughout, with the existing facilities
of the United Nations, which represent just about the limit of what can be
accomplished on the basis of a universal, or near-universal, governmental con-
sensus.
41. See id. at 413.
April 19741
